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Zoupaniotis: The Current Status of D.R. Horton, Pending Appellate Litigation,

THE CURRENT STATUS OF D.R. HORTON, PENDING APPELLATE
LITIGATION, AND PREDICTIONS OF SUPREME COURT REVIEW

Irene A. Zoupaniotis*
I. INTRODUCTION
Enforcement of arbitration agreements and class-action waivers has
been consistently upheld by the Supreme Court's construction and
interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Indeed, the Court
has generally found that resolution of claims as a class is a procedural,
not substantive, right and that as such, class action waivers are
enforceable under the FAA. Unlike the cases that have been decided by
the Supreme Court to date, the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")
protects employees' right to act in concert for the protection of their
interests. As such, the NLRA is unique in that collective action is a
substantive right within the statutory scheme.
Part II of this paper discusses the tension between the FAA and the
NLRA by outlining the Supreme Court's FAA jurisprudence and the
rights provided and protected by the NLRA. 1 Part III discusses the
National Labor Relations Board ("Board") decision and subsequent Fifth
2
Part IV
Circuit reversal in D.R. Horton and Murphy Oil USA, Inc.
examines the Board's strategy advocating its own construction of the
NLRA and FAA when analyzing class arbitration waivers, and includes
a discussion of recent Circuit Court decisions in the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits. 3
Lastly, Part V contemplates potential Supreme Court
treatment of D.R. Horton in light of the recent death of Justice Antonin
Scalia, as well as the three petitions for writ of certiorari pending before
the Supreme Court.4
* Irene A. Zoupaniotis is an associate in Farrell Fritz's labor & employment department. She assists
in the representation of employers in all aspects of litigation, arbitration, and mediation. Irene
earned her Juris Doctor, magna cum laude, from Hofstra University School of Law, where she was
an Articles Editor for the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal. Irene earned her Master of
Laws (LL.M.) from Columbia Law School, where she was a Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar.
1. See infra PartI.
2. See infra PartIII.
3. See infra PartIV.
4. In light of the results of the most recent election, and in the likely event that Circuit Judge
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II. THE FAA AND THE NLRA
A. The FAA
The FAA was originally enacted in 1925 and provides for the
enforcement of arbitration agreements by courts.
The broad
pronouncement of the enforceability of arbitration agreements is limited
by the statute's "savings clause," which provides that arbitration
agreements are enforceable to "save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract."
Modem Supreme Court jurisprudence has broadly interpreted the
scope and power of the FAA. One of the first Supreme Court cases
addressing the application of the FAA when it potentially conflicts with
another federal statutory regime was Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane
7
Corporation.
In Gilmer, the Court was asked to address whether
collective action claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA") may be arbitrated. The Court, in reading the FAA as
broadly permitting the resolution of statutory claims by arbitration if the
parties agree to the same, found nothing in the text or purpose of the
ADEA as explicitly precluding arbitration. 9
Moreover, the Court
rejected the argument that the provision in the ADEA allowing
collective suits did not create a substantive right to proceed
collectively. 10
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.," the
Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement that is silent on the
availability of class or collective action procedures will not have such
procedures inferred into it. 12 In reaching its holding, the Court reasoned
that there must be a contractual basis to find that the parties agreed to
class arbitration before the parties will be compelled to collectively
arbitrate their claims. 13 The following year, the Supreme Court

Merrick Garland is not appointed to the Supreme Court, this section will serve as an academic
analysis of what would have occurred under a full bench that included Circuit Judge Garland. See
infra Part V.
5. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
6. Id.
7. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
8. Id.at23.
9. Id. at 26-27.
10. See id. at 32 (quoting Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 241 (3d Cir. 1989)).
11. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
12. Id. at 687.
13. See id. at 682.
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addressed class arbitration waivers in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion.14 There, the Court considered whether a consumer contract
of adhesion that is found to be unconscionable under state contract law is
unenforceable under the FAA's "savings clause."15 In a five-to-four
decision authored by the late Justice Scalia, the Court held that the state
contract law finding class arbitration waivers unenforceable was
preempted by the FAA because it undercuts and hinders the purpose and
objectives of the Act, which is the efficient and expeditious resolution of
disputes by arbitration. 16
In 2013, Justice Scalia, again writing for the majority, addressed
class action waivers in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant.'7 In Italian Colors, the Court addressed whether class
arbitration waivers are enforceable under the FAA "when the [] cost of
individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds [the] potential
recovery."' 8 The Court answered in the affirmative, explaining that
prior to the adoption of class action procedures, individual suits
adequately protected the federal right.' 9 The Court further found that the
federal antitrust statute, the statute at issue in Italian Colors, has no
contrary congressional command requiring claims to be collectively
adjudicated.2 0
B. Section 7 "Substantive Right"
Section 7 of the NLRA confers the right of association to
employees. 2' Specifically, section 7 protects the employees' right "to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 22 To protect the rights
granted by section 7, section 8 provides that it is an unfair labor practice
if an employer "interfere[s] with, restrain[s], or coerce[s] employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7]."23 Indeed, any
individual contract that interferes with an employee's section 7 right to

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

563 U.S. 333 (2011).
See id. at 339-40.
See id. at 352.
570 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2307 (2013).
Id. at 2307.
Id. at 2311.
Id. at 2309.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
Id.
Id. § 158(a)(1).
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engage in concerted activity is unlawful.2 4
Unlike Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("FRCP"}-the statutory scheme for class actions, which has been held
to be a procedural rather than substantive right 25 -pursuing labor claims
as a class is protected under section 7 and 8, core provisions of the
NLRA. 26 For example, in In re 127 Restaurant Corp., the Board found
the formation of a class is protected concerted activity under section 7.27
Additionally, in Brady v. National FootballLeague, relying on the intent
and purpose of the Act, the Eighth Circuit permitted class action to
adjudicate federal labor claims. 28 Accordingly, unlike FRCP 23 and
other statutory regimes with collective action provisions, the NLRA
uniquely grants a substantive right to employees to concertedly protect
*
their employment
interests. 29
III.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT PAIRS ANALYZING

NLRA & FAA

A. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB
D.R. Horton involved a company that was a home building
operation across several states.30 In 2006, Horton implemented a Mutual
Arbitration Agreement and required all new and existing employees to
execute the agreement as a condition of their employment. 3 1 The
agreement set forth that employees consent to have all disputes and
claims, including claims for wages benefits and other compensation,
determined exclusively by arbitration and that the arbitrator has no
authority to consolidate claims or "fashion a proceeding as a class or
collective action." 3 2 Accordingly, all employment disputes would be
resolved solely through individual arbitration.
Michael Cuda worked for Horton as a superintendent from July
2005 to April 2006 and had executed the agreement during that time. 34
24. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944); see also Nat'l Licorice Co. v.
NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 360 (1940).
25. See Anchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612-13 (1997).
26. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158.
27. See 127 Rest. Corp., 331 N.L.R.B. 269, at 275 (May 26, 2000) (stating that a concerted
action, in accordance with section 7, "is protected activity unless done with malice or in bad faith").
28. See 644 F.3d 661, 673 (8th Cir. 2011).
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
30. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2013).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 349.
34. Id.
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In 2008, Mr. Cuda and a class of other superintendents commenced an
arbitration proceeding, alleging they were misclassified as exempt from
overtime protection in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"). 5 In response, Horton pointed to the Mutual Arbitration
Agreement, and posited that each employee can seek resolution of his or
her claim individually through arbitration.3 6 Thereafter, Mr. Cuda filed
an unfair labor practice charge, alleging the class action waiver violated
the NLRA.3
The Administrative Law Judge ("AL") found that the agreement
violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4) of the NLRA because an employee
could reasonably interpret the agreement as prohibiting him or her from
filing unfair labor practice charges with the Board, but dismissed the
38
allegation that the class action waiver violated section 8(a)(1).
In January 2012, the Board reversed the decision of the ALJ and
found that the agreement prohibited the exercise of substantive rights
39
protected by section 7 of the NLRA in violation of section 8(a)(1).
Section 8(a)(1) states that "it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
to 'interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in' [s]ection 7.",40 In order to evaluate whether section
8(a)(1) is violated, the Board will examine whether the employer rule
explicitly prohibits or limits activities that are protected by section 7.41
If there is no explicit prohibition, then the claimant must show either that
employees would reasonably interpret the rule as prohibiting section 7
activity, that the rule was enacted in response to union activity, or that
42
In this
the rule has been applied to curtail section 7 rights.
explicit
an
was
agreement
the
that
found
Board
circumstance, the
43
prohibition.
Under section 7, employees have a right "'to engage in . .
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
45
mutual aid or protection.'" Relying on Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, the
Board interpreted "mutual aid or protection" to include any employee

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id.
D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2278 (Jan. 3, 2012).
Id.
Id. at 2280 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2278 (citations omitted).
437 U.S. 556 (1978).
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effort to improve their terms and conditions of employment, which
includes improving conditions through administrative and judicial
forums.4 6 The Board stated that it has consistently held "that the NLRA
protects employees' ability to join together to pursue workplace
grievances, including through litigation."4 7 The Board further explained
that dispute resolution through arbitration is also protected as a
concerted activity under section 7.
Moreover, examining and
discussing the congressional intent when enacting the NLRA, the Board
highlighted that Congress recognized an inequality in bargaining
between employers and employees, and full freedom of association in
order to correct that inequality. 49 Accordingly, the Board interpreted
collective action as "the core of what Congress intended to protect by
adopting the broad language of [s]ection 7."so
After finding that the employer's conduct violated the NLRA, the
Board discussed the interaction of the NLRA with the FAA and
concluded that the two statutes are not in conflict under the facts of the
case.51
The FAA was enacted with the intent to "'reverse the
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements."' 5 2 However,
the agreements still remain subject to the same defenses as other
contracts.
The Board highlighted that the Supreme Court has
permitted the resolution of statutory claims through arbitration, unless
the party gives up a substantive right granted by the statute.54 The Board
explained that the right to engage in collective action, including legal
action in a judicial or arbitral forum, is a substantive right under the
NLRA. 5 As such, it clarified that while FRCP 23 and the collective
class action procedures in the FLSA are procedural rules, employees
acting concertedly by invoking these procedural rules to improve the
terms and conditions of their employment is a substantive right protected
by section 7.56 Further, the Board supported its determination that the
FAA and NLRA are not in conflict with one another by finding that its
46. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. at 2278; see also Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565-566.
47. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. at 2278.
48. Id. at 2278-79 ("No one doubts that the processing of a grievance in such a manner is
concerted activity within the meaning of [section] 7." (quoting NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc.,
456 U.S. 822, 836 (1984))).
49. Id. at 2279 (citations omitted).
50. Id.
51. See id. at 2283-84.
52. Id. at 2284 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/ Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)).
53. Id. at 2284.
54. Id. at 2285 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 2286.
56. Id.
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interpretation of the class-action waiver as violating the NLRA falls
within the savings clause of section 2 of the FAA, which provides that
an agreement may be invalidated upon "any 'grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.' 57 Relying on J.L Case Co.
v. NLRB" and its progeny-which held private agreements could be
invalidated if they restrict NLRA rights-the Board concluded that an
arbitration agreement could be invalidated for restricting NLRA rights,
59
as it falls squarely within the savings clause exception to the FAA.
The Board further examined the underlying policy associated with
60
the FAA as iterated in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion and StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,61 and concluded that
while the Supreme Court found the purpose of the FAA was
enforcement of arbitration agreements to ensure an informal and
streamlined process, this policy is not in tension with the policies of the
NLRA.6 2 Unlike the agreement in Concepcion that involved a consumer
contract of adhesion involving thousands of consumers, the case at issue
involved a limited set of employees and, as such, did not have the same
concerns of efficiency, cost, and informality as Concepcion.6 3
Lastly, the Board maintained that even in the event of a direct
conflict, the FAA should yield since the Norris-La Guardia Act was
enacted after the FAA and, as such, repealed all parts of the FAA in
conflict with it.64 The Norris-La Guardia Act states that a private
agreement is unenforceable if it prohibits "a 'lawful means [of] aiding
any person participating or interested in' a lawsuit arising out of a labor
dispute." 65 Accordingly, if the agreement violates the Act, the FAA
must give way to the later promulgated statute and the agreement cannot
be enforced.66
The Fifth Circuit was unconvinced by the Board's interpretation of
the FAA's savings clause in relation to section 7 of the NLRA in light of
57. Id. at 2287.
58. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
59. See id. at 334-37; DR. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. at 2287 (citations omitted).
60. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. at 2287; see also AT&T Mobility LLC, v. Concepcion,
563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) ("The overarching purpose of the FAA ... is to ensure the enforcement of
arbitration agreements.... Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.").
61. See 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (arguing that an arbitration arising out of a maritime
transaction is not only valid and enforceable, but it is also irrevocable) (citations omitted).
62. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. at 2287.
63. Id. (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 2288.
65. Id. (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 2287.
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the Supreme Court's decision in Concepcion.
As explained in
Concepcion, class action procedure runs afoul of the main advantage of
arbitration, which is its informality.68 Accordingly, "requiring the
availability of class actions interferes with fundamental attributes of
arbitration and creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA." 6 9 As such,
in interpreting Concepcion, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the savings
clause is inapplicable in this case and that the agreement would be
unenforceable if the NLRA contains a congressional command to
override the FAA. 70 The Fifth Circuit further indicated in D.R. Horton,
Inc. that there is no argument of explicit congressional intent within the
NLRA to override the FAA, but rather that the structure and purpose of
the statutes is where the congressional intent can be inferred.7 1 Relying
on the Supreme Court's prior decisions where it refused to find an
override of the FAA even with specific collective action procedures
within a statutory scheme to protect the statutory right,72 the Fifth
Circuit refused to interpret general language without more as insufficient
to infer congressional command to override the FAA.
The court
further reasoned that other circuits that have considered this issue have
not deferred to the NLRB's rationale and enforced the class waivers.7 4
67. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 359 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 359-60 (citations omitted).
69. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
70. Id. at 360.
71. Id. at 361 (citations omitted).
72. See id. at 360 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 360-61.
74. See id. at 348, 362 (citing Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 734 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2013);
Sutherland v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702
F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2013)). It should be noted that since the Richards decision in 2013, the
Ninth Circuit has rendered a decision in 2016 that found prohibiting a concerted legal claim in any
forum regarding wages, hours or terms of employment violates the NLRA. See infra Part IV.
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its decision in Owen. Cellular Sales of Missouri v.
NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2016). Also of note, while the Second Circuit has found class
action waivers enforceable, a recent decision by the Second Circuit has hinted a change in its view.
In Patterson v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc., 15-cv-2820, 2016 WL 4598542 (2d Cir. Sept. 14,
2016), while the court affirmed its own precedent in Sutherland, it noted in dicta that if the court
were reviewing the issue "on a clean slate," it very well may have been persuaded by the reasoning
set forth in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in finding the class waivers unenforceable. In addition to
the circuits that have addressed the application of the Board's analysis in D.R. Horton, numerous
federal district courts across the country have also rejected the Board's reasoning and found class

waivers to be enforceable. See Diaz v. Mich. Logistics Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 375, 382 (E.D.N.Y.
2016); Nanavati v. Adecco USA, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1077-79 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Ortiz v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1070, 1082-83 (E.D. Cal. 2014); Longnecker v. Am.
Express Co., 23 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1112-13 (D. Ariz. 2014); Green v. Zachry Indus., Inc., 36 F.
Supp. 3d 669, 675 (W.D. Va. 2014); Dixon v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, 947 F. Supp. 2d 390,
403, 403 n. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ryan v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 924 F. Supp. 2d 559, 563
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As such, the Fifth Circuit, in an effort to avoid a circuit split, declined to
defer to the NLRB's interpretation of Concepcion and its application in
the context of administering the NLRA.
Although it rejected the NLRB's analysis pertaining to the
claimant's section 8(a)(1) claim that the class waiver interfered with his
section 7 rights granted by the NLRA, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
Board's finding that the agreement violated section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4)
because the language of the agreement could result in the employee
reasonably believing that he or she is prohibited from filing an unfair

(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Long v. BDP Int'l, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 2d 832, 852 n. 11 (S.D. Tex. 2013); Delock
v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 784, 789-91 (E.D. Ark. 2012); Morvant v. P.F.
Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831, 845 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Jasso v. Money Mart Exp.,
Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Levison v. MasTec, Inc., No. 8:15-cv-1547T26AEP, 2015 WL 5021645, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2015) (citing Walthour v. Chipio
Windshield Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d 1326, 1332 (11th Cir. 2014)); Martinez v. Leslie's Poolmart,
Inc., No. 8:14-cv-01481-CAS(CWx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156218, at *12-13, *12 n.5 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 3, 2014); Chico v. Hilton Worldwide, Inc., No. CV 14-5750-JFW (SSx), 2014 WL 5088240,
at *13 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2014); Fardig v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. SACV 14-561 JVS(ANx),
2014 WL 2810025, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2014); Cohn v. Ritz Transp., Inc., No. 2:1 1-CV-1832
JCM NJK, 2014 WL 1577295, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 17, 2014) (citations omitted); Appelbaum v.
AutoNation Inc., No. SACV 13-01927 JVS(RNBx), 2014 WL 1396585, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8,
2014) (citations omitted); Hickey v. Brinker Int'l Payroll Co., L.P., No. 1:13-cv-00951-REB-BNB,
2014 WL 622883, at *2-3 (D. Colo. Feb. 18, 2014) (citations omitted); Zabelny v. CashCall, Inc.,
No. 2:13-cv-00853-PAL, 2014 WL 67638, at *12-14 (D. Nev. Jan. 8, 2014) (citations omitted); Siy
v. CashCall, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00953-PAL, 2014 WL 37879 at *12-15 (D. Nev. Jan. 6, 2014);
Fimby-Christensen v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., No.: 5:13-cv-01007-EJD, 2013 WL 6158040, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2013) (citations omitted); Smith v. BT Conferencing, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-160,
2013 WL 5937313, at *21-22 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 5, 2013); Sylvester v. Wintrust Fin. Corp., No. 12 C
01899, 2013 WIL 5433593, at *7-9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2013); Lloyd v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.,
Nos. 11 Civ. 9305(LTS), 12 Civ. 2197(LTS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129102, at *20, *20 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2013); Cunningham v. Leslie's Poolmart, Inc., No. CV 13-2122 CAS (CWx),
2013 WL 3233211, at *12 n.11 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013); Brown v. Citicorp Credit Serys., No.
1:12-CV-62-BLW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59616, at *4-5 (D. Id. Apr. 24, 2013); NoffsingerHarrison v. LP Spring City, LLC, No. 1:12-CV-161, 2013 WL 499210, at *5-6 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 7,
2013); Miguel v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. CV 12-3308 PSG (PLAx), 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16865, at *21-25 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2013); Cohen v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 12 Civ.
2147(BSJ)(JLC), 2012 WL 6041634, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2012); Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness
USA, Inc., No. H-10-3009, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143879, at *3-7 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2012); Spears
v. Mid-America Waffles, Inc., No. 11-2273-CM, 2012 WL 2568157, at *2-3 (D. Kan. July 2, 2012);
Luciana De Oliveira v. Citicorp N. Am., Inc., No. 8:12-cv-251-T-26TGW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
69573, at *6-7 (M.D. Fla. May 18, 2012); Palmer v. Convergys Corp., No. 7:10-cv-145(HL), 2012
WL 425256, at *3 n.2 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2012); LaVoice v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11 Civ.
2308(BSJ)(JLC), 2012 WL 124590, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2012); Iskanian v. CLS Transportation
Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 371-73 (2014); Reyes v. Liberman Broad., Inc., 146
Cal.Rptr.3d 616, 633-35 (Cal. App. 2d 2012); Truly Nolen of America v. Superior Court, 145
Cal.Rptr.3d 432, 452 (Cal. App. 2d 2012); Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc., 144
Cal.Rptr.3d 198, 212-14 (Cal. App. 1st 2012).
75. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
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labor charge with the Board.7 6
B. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB
Murphy Oil USA, Inc. ("Murphy Oil") operates retail gas
stations.77
The charging parties worked at its Alabama facility
beginning in November 2008.
Employees were required to sign a
binding arbitration agreement consenting to resolution of all
employment disputes by arbitration and waiving the right to pursue
collective claims in arbitral or judicial forum.7 ' In June 2010, four
employees filed a collective action in the District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama alleging violations of the FLSA.o In response,
Murphy Oil moved to dismiss the action, citing the agreement as the
basis for dismissal. 8 ' The employees opposed, arguing that the
agreement interfered with their rights under the NLRA to engage in
section 7 protected concerted activity and filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the Board in January 2011.82
While this matter was pending, the Board rendered its decision in
D.R. Horton,8 3 and consequently Murphy Oil implemented a revised
arbitration agreement to provide that employees are not prohibited from
adjudicating unfair labor charges before the Board. 84 Nevertheless, the
agreement was inapplicable to the claimants in Murphy Oil, as they were
hired prior to the date of the adoption of the revised agreement. 81 While
the Board was contemplating the unfair labor practice charge in this
matter, the Fifth Circuit rendered its decision in D.R. Horton, which
rejected the Board's interpretation of the NLRA and FAA.86
Nevertheless, the Board remained unconvinced by the Fifth Circuit
decision and, instead, reaffirmed its own D.R. Horton decision, 87
holding that Murphy Oil violated section 8(a)(1) by requiring its
employees to agree to resolve all employment disputes through

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id. at 363-64.
Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1015-16.

83.

Id. at 1016 (citations omitted).

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1017 (citations omitted).
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88
individual arbitration in contravention to section 7 of the NLRA.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the Board's decision and reaffirmed its
reasoning in D.R. Horton. 9 While the court did not repeat its analysis
and reasoning from D.R. Horton, it simply explained that its prior
decision forecloses the argument set forth in the Board's order in the

Fifth Circuit." The court highlighted that "[t]hough the Board might not
need to acquiesce in [its] decisions, it is a bit bold for [the Board] to hold
that an employer who followed the reasoning of [the court's] D.R.
Horton decision had no basis in fact or law or an 'illegal objective' in
doing so."91 The court further recommended the Board "strike a more
respectful balance between its views and those of circuit courts
reviewing its orders."9 2
In September 2016, the NLRB filed a petition for writ of certiorari
93
with the Supreme Court.
IV.

SUBSEQUENT NLRB DECISIONS AND FEDERAL APPELLATE
REVIEW

The Board has remained obstinate despite contrary decisions
emanating from the Fifth Circuit and the other circuits that have
addressed this issue; 9 4 instead, it continues to reaffirm its own D.R.
Horton decision. Currently, there are numerous cases involving the D.R.
Horton issue pending in the federal appellate courts on review from

88. Id. at 1017-18.
89. Id. at 1018.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1021.
92. Id.
93. Reply Brief for Petitioner, Murphy Oil, USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (No. 16-307)
(5th Cir. Sept. 9, 2016).
94. Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdales, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2014)
(distinguishing this case from D.R. Horton, where execution of the agreement was a condition of
employment, the Ninth Circuit held that a class action waiver is enforceable if the employee entered
freely into the agreement) (citations omitted); Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC, 745
F.3d 1326, 1332, 1334 (11th Cir. 2014) (relying on the Fifth Circuit's decision in D.R. Horton
where it found FLSA does not prohibit an employer from including a collective action waiver in an
arbitration agreement) (citations omitted); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young, 726 F.3d 290, 297-98 n.8
(2d Cir. 2013) (noting that the Second Circuit declined to follow the Board's decision in D.R.
Horton, and that it owed no deference to the Board's reasoning as it trended upon federal statutes
and policies unrelated to the NLRA); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1053-54 (8th Cir.
2013) (finding D.R. Horton inapplicable as the Board's limited decision involved agreements that
foreclose all concerted action, whereas the facts presented in the instant case did not preclude filing
with an administrative body; moreover, it noted that the court is under no obligation to defer to the
Board's interpretation of Supreme Court precedent).
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decisions of the Board. 95 Pursuant to section 10(f) of the NLRA, a final
order of the Board is reviewable by the U.S. Court of Appeals in the
circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have
occurred, wherein the employer transacts business, or in the D.C.
Circuit. 9 6 As a result, several national companies have petitioned for

"

review in the Fifth Circuit.97 In addition, the Board's appellate strategy
has also included filing amicus curiae briefs in private actions that do
not involve review of a Board decision.9 8
Recently, the Board has had success in its efforts to create a circuit
split-the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have ruled in the Board's favor,
adopting its interpretation of the NLRA in relation to Supreme Court
precedent pertaining to enforcement of arbitration agreements pursuant
to the FAA. 99 In the interest of brevity, this Article will only discuss the
decisions in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, which created a circuit split
with the Fifth, Second, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits.
A. Lewis v. Epic Systems Corporation
Jacob Lewis worked for Epic Systems Corporation ("Epic
Systems") and as a condition of his employment executed an arbitration
95.

Waivers,

See Russ Bleemer, Cutting Arbitration Classes: Facing Court Defeats on Workplace

the

NLRB

Refuses

To

Back

Down,

JOSSEY-BASS

(Jan.

2016),

http://www.altnewsletter.com/sample-articles/cutting-arbitration-classes.aspx.

96. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2012).
97. See BNA-Workplace Law Report, NLRB, Employers Urge Justices to Rule on Class
Waivers,
BNA
(Sept.
16,
2016,
12:00
AM),
https://convergenceapi.bna.com/ui/content/articleStandalone/245531520000000005/372617?redirec
t-1&ReportGuid=E4DOBEAF-01AO-4EE6-9AAA-CE9FBF3F2CIF.
98. See, e.g., Brief for the NLRB as Amicus Curiae Urging Reversal in Support of PlaintiffsApellants, Patterson v. Raymours Furniture Co., 659 F. App'x 40 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 2015) (No. 152820); Brief for the NLRB as Amicus Curiae Urging Affirmance in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee,
Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 15-cv-82-bbc, 2015 WL 5330300 (7th Cir. Dec. 16, 2015) (No. 152997); Brief for the NLRB as Amicus Curiae Urging Partial Reversal in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants, Morris v. Ernst & Young, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 2015) (No. 13-16599).
99. See, e.g., Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), petitionfor cert.
filed, (U.S. Sept. 8, 2016) (No. 16-300); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016),
petitionfor cert. filed, (U.S. Sept. 3, 2016) (No. 16-285).
100. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 2015);
Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdales, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted);
Sutherland v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297-98, n.8 (2d Cir. 2013); D.R. Horton v.
NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2013); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1053-54 (8th
Cir. 2013). Disputes arising from enforcement of a class action arbitration waiver are also pending
for appellate review in the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Tenth and D.C. Circuits. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc.
v. NLRB, 808.F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. granted (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017) (No. 16307) (citation omitted). Appellants in all these matters are advocating for adoption of the Board's
rule, relying on the same arguments set forth before the Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits.
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agreement wherein he consented to individually arbitrate all claims
arising out of his employment.o Lewis and other similarly situated
employees filed a claim under the FLSA that they were misclassified as
exempt from overtime wages. 10 2 Epic Systems filed a motion to dismiss
the case on the ground that the employee's claims are subject to an
arbitration agreement. 10 3 The employees opposed the motion, arguing
the agreement was unconscionable and, alternatively, the waiver of class
claims should be invalidated as inconsistent with D.R. Horton.104
The district court, after briefly discussing the Board's analysis in
D.R. Horton, noted "courts must give considerable deference to the
Board's interpretations of the NLRA." 105 Regarding the Fifth Circuit's
reversal of the Board in D.R. Horton, the court explained that "the
majority never persuasively rebutted the board's conclusion that a
collective litigation waiver violates the NLRA and never explained why,
if there is tension between the NLRA and the FAA, it is the FAA that
should trump the NLRA, rather than the reverse."' 0 6 Accordingly, the
court found that absent a contrary ruling from its regional circuit or the
Supreme Court, it will defer to the Board's interpretation and, as such,
dismissed Epic System's motion. 107
Epic Systems appealed to the Seventh Circuit and the Board filed
an amicus curiae brief in support of the employee.10 8 The Board's brief
set forth many of the same arguments expressed in its D.R. Horton and
Murphy Oil decisions. 109 Additionally, the Board emphasized the
inherent flaws it found in the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in reversing the
Board.o Significantly, the Board highlighted that the Supreme Court
had never addressed an arbitration agreement's concerted-action waiver
on the NLRA rights of employees.1 1 ' Unlike the Supreme Court cases
relied upon by the Fifth Circuit in support of its holding which involved

101. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 15-cv-82-bbc, 2015 WL 5330300, at *1 (Dist. Ct. Wisc.
Sept. 11, 2015).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at*2.
106. Id.
107. Id. at *3.
108. Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae Urging Affirmance in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee, at
1-2, Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 15-cv-82-BBC, 2015 WL 5330300 (7th Cir. Dec. 16, 2015) (No.
15-2997).
109. See id. at 2-4 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at23-24.
111. Id. at 24-25.
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other statutory frameworks,1 12 the Board argued that the NLRA is a
distinctive statute and the rights granted by it are materially different
from other laws. 13 Specifically, the Board explained that the collective
action provisions in federal statutes such as the FLSA and ADEA are
procedural means to effectuate the ultimate goal of the statute and do not
waive a substantive right by agreeing to individual arbitration. 114 On the
contrary, the concerted activity in the NLRA is itself a core statutory
right protected in section 7 of the Act, which is absent from those other
federal statutes."' As such, the Board concluded that because a
different statutory right is involved, there should be a different result
with respect to the FAA's enforcement mandate. 1 16
On May 26, 2016, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the agreement
violated the NLRA and was unenforceable under the FAA, thereby
diverging from its sister circuits' rulings and creating a split amongst
federal appellate courts.117 The court first addressed "other concerted
activities" in section 7 of the NLRA, discussing the text, history and
purpose of the provision. 118 The court determined that collective legal
proceedings fall within the ordinary meaning of "other concerted
activities." 19 The court then discussed the purpose and history of the
provision, asserting that in enacting section 7, Congress intended to
equalize bargaining power of the employer and employee. 120
Accordingly, it found that section 7 was meant to be interpreted broadly
and include collective remedies. 12 1 The court further explained that even
if the provision was deemed to be "ambiguous," the Board's
interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference. 12 2 Finally, the court was
unconvinced by Epic Systems' argument that class actions were not a
concerted activity contemplated by Congress because Rule 23 was
enacted subsequent to the NLRA. 12 3 In rejecting its argument, the court
found there was no indication that Congress intended to protect only the
112. See id. at 23-24.
113. Id. at 24-25.
114. Id. at 25.
115. Id. at 25-26.
116. Id. at 27-28.
117. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 2016).
118. Id. at 1151-54.
119. Id. at 1153 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (defining "concerted" as
"jointly arranged, planned, or carried out; coordinated" and activities as "thing[s] that a person or
group does or has done" or "actions taken by a group in order to achieve their aims").
120. Id. (citations omitted).
121. Id.
122. Id. (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 1154 (citations omitted).
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activities that were available at the time the NLRA was enacted and
further noted that, nevertheless, Congress was aware of class and
collective proceedings when it passed the NLRA. 124
After examining the meaning of section 7, the court analyzed
whether the arbitration provision at issue impinged on section 7 rights. 125
Epic System's contract required employee claims to be arbitrated on an
individual basis and waived the right to class or collective proceedings
in any forum.1 2 6 The court reasoned that Epic System's contract
impinged on the rights protected by section 7 by interfering with the
employees' right to concerted activity, which included collective legal
proceedings. 12 7 The court concluded that the arbitration provision
violated section 7 and section 8 of the NLRA. 128
Next, the court discussed at length the FAA and whether it
supersedes the NLRA, thus mandating enforcement of the arbitration
provision. 129 The court concluded that the two statutes do not conflict,
because the FAA does not require the enforcement of the arbitration
clause. 130 Noting the heavy burden on Epic Systems to demonstrate a
conflict between the two statutes, the court concluded that because the
clause is unlawful under section 7, it falls within the "savings clause" of
the FAA. 13 1 Accordingly, the court held that the two statutes may be
reconciled and given effect. 132
The court addressed the Fifth Circuit's decision in D.R. Horton,
specifically its reliance on dicta in Italian Colors and Concepcion that
class arbitration procedures burden arbitration by negatively impacting
its efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 133 The court explained these
Supreme Court decisions cannot be read as requiring a finding that
anything that "makes arbitration less attractive [will] automatically
conflict[] with the FAA."13 4 Indeed, it reasoned that protecting an
arbitration agreement from judicial challenge would raise this type of
contract above others.1 3 5
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1154-56.
126. Id. at 1154.
127. Id. at 1155 (citations omitted).
128. Id. at 1155-56 (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 1156-61.
130. Id. at 1156.
131. Id. at 1157, 1159 (citations omitted) (noting that "illegality is a standard contract defense
contemplated by the FAA's savings clause").
132. Id. at 1158.
133. Id. at 1157-58 (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 1158.
135. See id. at 1159-60.
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Lastly, the court rejected Epic System's argument that section 7 is a
procedural, as opposed to substantive, right. 136 The court reasoned that
section 7 is the core substantive right in the NLRA, as all other
provisions are for the enforcement of section 7.137 Further, the court
emphasized that section 7 is not a procedural right like Rule 23, the
ADEA and the FLSA, but rather more akin to association rights like
those protected by the First Amendment. 13 8
Based on this reasoning, the Seventh Circuit strayed from the
conclusions of other federal appellate courts and adopted the Board's
reasoning in D.R. Horton.139 Epic Systems has petitioned for a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court. 14 0 In light of a similar decision from the
Ninth Circuit, which is discussed more fully below, and the circuit split
amongst the federal appellate courts that have addressed D.R. Horton,
the issue appears ripe for Supreme Court review.
B. Morrisv. Ernst & Young LLP
Plaintiffs Stephen Morris and Kelly McDaniel were offered
employment with Ernst & Young LLP ("EY") through an offer letter
which included a copy of EY's arbitration agreement. 14 1 The arbitration
agreement included a provision requiring all employment-related
disputes to be mediated or arbitrated individually. 14 2 Plaintiffs filed an
action in federal court alleging claims of federal and state wage and hour
violations, to which EY moved to dismiss or, alternatively, to stay and
compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the arbitration agreement. 143
In support of its motion, EY argued that the FAA mandates arbitration
because there is no evidence of Congressional intent to preclude the
waiver.144 Persuaded by the Eighth Circuit's decision,145 as well as a
decision in the U.S. District Court Northern District of California, 146 the

136. Id. at 1160.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1160-61.
139. See id. at 1160 (citations omitted).
140. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. Sept. 2,
2016) (No. 16-285).
141. Morris v. Ernst & Young, No. 12-04964, 2013 WL 3460052, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 9,
2013).
142. Id. at *4.
143. Id. at *1.
144. Id. at *3.
145. See Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013).
146. See Jasso v. Money Mart Exp., Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
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14 7
court rejected Plaintiffs' D.R. Horton argument.
On August 22, 2016, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's
order, and held that the NLRA is violated if an employer requires its
employees to sign a waiver that compels the employees to individually
arbitrate all claims regarding wages, hours, and terms and conditions of
their employment. 148 Specifically, the court reasoned that there is no
language in the NLRA that explicitly overrides the FAA and, as such, is
bound by the Supreme Court's strong articulation of favoring
enforcement of arbitration agreements in Concepcion.14 9 Indeed, the
court refused to give deference to the Board's interpretation because that
interpretation impedes on the FAA. 150
The Ninth Circuit, unconvinced by the district court's refusal to
give the Board's interpretation deference, first reviewed the Board's
determination in the context of this case by analyzing the Board's
interpretation of section 7 and section 8 through the lens of the Chevron
analysis.15' The court concluded that the inquiry ends at the first step of
Chevron, determining that Congress's intent is clear and unambiguous
15 2
It
from the statute and consistent with the Board's interpretation.
'clearly
explained "[t]he pursuit of concerted work-related legal claim[s]
fall[] within the literal wording of interpretation of [section] 7.'"153
Similarly, because the clause impeded exercise of the employee's
section 7 right and the waiver was a condition of employment, the Court
deferred to the Board's interpretation of section 8, and determined that
provision of the NLRA was also violated. 154 Indeed, the court cites to
the Seventh Circuit's decision in further support of its conclusion that a
contract restraining the exercise of section 7, as a condition of
55
employment, violates section 8 of the NLRA.1
Next, the court discussed the NLRA in relation to the FAA and
ultimately reconciled both federal statutes by finding that the provision
at issue is invalid, because it violates the NLRA and falls within the
Consistent with the Seventh Circuit's
FAA's savings clause. 156
reasoning, the Ninth Circuit found that the FAA does not require

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Morris, 2013 WL 3460052, at *10.
Morris v. Ernst & Young, 843 F.3d 975, 990 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 988 (citations omitted).
See id. at 988-89.
Id. at 980-83 (citations omitted).
Id. at 981, 983.
Id. at 982 (citing NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260 (1975)).
Id. at 982, 984.
Id. at 983 (citations omitted).
Id. at 984-86, 988.
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enforcement of the provision at issue.157 Specifically, the savings clause
prevents enforcement of an arbitration clause that has the contract
defense of illegality.158
Central to the court's analysis was its
determination that section 7 is a substantive right-distinguishing the
NLRA from other statutes with class or concerted action provisions
which the Supreme Court found to be a procedural right. 159
The dissent by Circuit Judge Ikuta focused on the Supreme Court's
precedent regarding arbitration agreement enforcement decisions.16 0
Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions, Circuit Judge Ikuta
concluded that there must be an express Congressional mandate in the
statute for enforcement of the arbitration agreement to be precluded.1 6 1
Circuit Judge Ikuta rejected the conclusion drawn by the majority that
section 7 creates a substantive right to arbitrate or litigate employment
disputes as a group.162 He reasoned that without explicit authorization of
collective actions in the text of the statute or discussion of class action in
the legislative history of the Act, there is no support for the majority's
position that the NLRA prohibits enforcement of arbitration provision
with a class action waiver provision.16 1
With respect to the FAA, the dissent argued that the majority
inappropriately applied the savings clause to a federal statute. 1 Even if
the savings clause was applicable, Circuit Judge Ikuta argued that
Supreme Court jurisprudence demands for enforcement of the agreement
because permitting such a right interferes with the purpose and policy of
arbitration. 16 As expected, EY filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in
September 2016.166
157. See id. at 987. Like the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the cases raising
the D.R. Horton issue from other FAA enforcement cases. Id. Specifically, it highlights that unlike
all other Supreme Court FAA enforcement cases, these cases involve the waiver of a federal
substantive right. Id. at 987-88. Additionally, it argues that reliance on Concepcion and Italian
Colors arguments regarding adequacy of arbitration is inapposite to cases involving the illegality of
a contract term under the NLRA. Id. at 988 (citations omitted). Lastly, the Court rejects the
argument that invalidating the clause would disfavor arbitration, since the result would be the same
even if the restriction on concerted activity involved an exclusive forum other than arbitration. Id.
at 989.
158. See id. 985-86.
159. See id. at 988.
160. See id. at 990, 997.
161. Id. at 997.
162. See id. at 995.
163. See id. at 996.
164. Id. at 997.
165. Id. (discussing AT&T Mobility LLV v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011)).
166. See Kat Greene, Ernst & Young Urges High Court to Take on Class Waivers, LAw360,
(Sept. 8, 2016, 5:36 PM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/837913/ernst-young-urges-high-court-to-
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V. POTENTIAL SUPREME COURT TREATMENT

It is evident from the Supreme Court's treatment of the FAA that
the statute is given a broad interpretation and is regarded with substantial
deference. As such, the trend of the Supreme Court has been to enforce
arbitration agreements, including class action waivers, under the FAA,
despite conflicting federal statutory regimes or state law. 167 Moreover,
several of the cases involving issues pertaining to class action or
interpretation of the FAA have been narrow five-to-four decisions that
have been split along ideological lines.1 68
Based on Supreme Court jurisprudence to date, it would have been
reasonable to anticipate that if the Supreme Court was to grant certiorari
to address the issues raised by D.R. Horton, it would enforce the class
arbitration waiver under the FAA. However, with the death of Justice
Scalia, who authored several majority opinions interpreting the FAA,
there is now uncertainty surrounding the outcome of these issues.1 69 The
four justices that dissented in Concepcion remain on the court, and are
unlikely to push for stricter application of Concepcion in future cases.170
Moreover, commentators have opined that Justice Scalia's successor will
likely be "less hostile to class claims than he was."' 71 As such, "there is
a good chance that the court will begin limiting the effect of Concepcion
when it next considers state law rules regarding adhesive employment
contracts." 72
In light of the recent Presidential election, which results in
Republican control of the executive branch, the future composition of
the Supreme Court, by the time the petition for writ of certiorari is
reviewed by the Court, is nebulous.1 73
take-on-class-waivers.
167. See, e.g., DirectTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. _,136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (explaining
the decision "falls well within the confines of [] present well-established law").
168. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 334 (2011); Rent-A-Center, West, Inc.
v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2010).
169. See Gordon W. Renneisen, The Post-ScaliaFate of Employment Class Waivers, LAW360
(Mar. 9, 2016, 11:25 AM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/768875/the-post-scalia-fate-ofemployment-class-waivers.
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. During the campaign, President Trump released a list of candidates he is considering for
nomination to the Supreme Court. See DonaldJ Trump FinalizesList of PotentialSupreme Court
Justice Picks, DONALDJTRUMP.COM (Sept. 23, 2016) https://www.donaldjtrump.com/pressThe twenty-one
releases/donald-j.-trump-adds-to-list-of-potential-supreme-court-justice-picks.
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Assuming arguendo that the appointment of Circuit Judge Garland
occurs, and he fills a vacant Supreme Court seat when the D.R. Horton
issue is reviewed, an examination of his past judicial rulings may
provide insight into how the Court may come out on this issue. 174 While
Circuit Judge Garland has not opined on a matter directly discussing the
applicability of FAA where an arbitration agreement waives a statutory
right or class action,17 5 he has reviewed several Board decisions.176 Of
candidates included: Keith Blackwell, Charles Canady, Steven Colloton, Allison Eid, Neil Gorsuch,
Raymond Gruender, Thomas Hardiman, Joan Larsen, Mike Lee, Thomas Lee, Edward Mansfield,
Federico Moreno, William Pryor, Margaret A. Ryan, Amul Thapar, Timothy Tymkovich, David
Stras, Diane Sykes, Don Willett, and Robert Young. Id. Since President-Elect Trump's victory to
the White House, his transition team has narrowed down the potential nominees to the following:
Circuit Judge William Pryor of the Eleventh Circuit; Circuit Judge Diana Sykes of the Seventh
Circuit; Circuit Judge Raymond Kethledge of the Sixth Circuit; Justice Joan Larsen of the Michigan
Supreme Court; Circuit Judge Neil Gorsuch of the Tenth Circuit; Circuit Judge Steven Colloton of
the Eighth Circuit; Circuit Judge Raymond Gruender of the Eighth Circuit; and Circuit Judge
Thomas Hardiman of the Third Circuit. See Josh Gerstein, A Closer Look at Trump's Potential
Supreme
Court
Nominees,
POLITICO
(Jan.
3,
2017,
6:38
AM)
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/trumps-supreme-court-nominees-233115. All the potential
nominees in the pared-down list are conservative jurists, several of which have clerked for

conservative Supreme Court Justices, including Justice Antonin Scalia. Id. It is clear that President
Trump wants to fill the vacant seat with a judge in the image of Justice Scalia. While many of these
candidates serve as judges on Circuit Courts that have addressed the issue of the enforceability of
class action arbitration waivers, Circuit Judges Colloton and Gruender have actually ruled on the
issue. See Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2016) (relying on Fifth
Circuit case law and Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013), the Court declined
to enforce the Board's order finding the class action waiver violates sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA);
Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013) (Gruender, C.J.). Should either of these
judges be appointed to the Supreme Court in the future, there is no doubt that they will rule in line
with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the law and enforce class action waiver provisions in

arbitration agreements. On January 31, 2017, President Trump nominated Circuit Judge Neil
Gorsuch to fill the vacant U.S. Supreme Court seat. Matt Ford, Trump Nominates Neil Gorsuchfor
the
U.S.
Supreme
Court,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Jan.
31,
2017,
8:50
PM),

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/0 1/gorsuch-trump-supreme-court/5 15 232/.
Circuit Judge Gorsuch and Justice Scalia, both originalists, are cut from the same cloth. Id.
Nevertheless, given the contentious environment in the Senate and the Democratic party's
resentment towards, the Republicans' treatement of Circuit Judge Garland, it is difficult to predict
whether Circuit Judge Gorsuch will be approved by the Senate by the time the Supreme Court rules

on the pending matters regarding the enforceability of class action arbitration waivers.
174. See Vin Gurrieri, A Justice Garland Could Benefit Employees At High Court, LAW360
(Mar. 16, 2016, 10:56 PM) http://www.1aw360.com/articles/772391/a-justice-garland-could-benefitemployees-at-high-court.
175. But see Kurke v. Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc., 454 F.3d 350, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Garland,
C.J.) (ruling that the FAA only permits four grounds upon which an arbitration award may be

vacated, and that the "manifest disregard of the law" standard is extremely difficult to satisfy).
176. See Spurlino Materials, LLC v. NLRB, 805 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cit. 2015); Pacific Coast
Supply, LLC v. NLRB, 801 F.3d 321 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Monmouth Care Center v. NLRB, 672 F.3d
1085 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Wayneview Care Center v. NLRB, 664 F.3d 341 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Spectrum
Health-Kent Community Campus v. NLRB, 647 F.3d 341 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Bally's Park Place,
Inc. v. NLRB, 646 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Guard Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol34/iss1/5

20

Zoupaniotis: The Current Status of D.R. Horton, Pending Appellate Litigation,

2016]

THE CURRENT STATUS OFD.R. HORTON

157

the twenty-three decisions involving review of the NLRB, only four of
these decisions ruled against the Board.17 1 Indeed, in his review of the
Board, Circuit Judge Garland has deferred to the Board's rulings,
Although granting
applying Chevron analysis in his review.178
deference to an agency reflects a judicial restraint, since the judiciary is
unwilling to reverse an agency's ruling or opinion even if the reviewing
judge would have ruled differently had it been in the shoes of the Board
members, deeper examination of Circuit Judge Garland's decisions
reflect an employee-side leaning. 179
For example, in Guard Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 180 one of the four
cases where Circuit Judge Garland ruled against the Board, the circuit
court's ruling set aside a Board finding that an employer's actions were
not an unfair labor practice.181 Similarly in United Food & Commercial
Workers InternationalUnion Local 400, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, the circuit
court reviewed the Board's findings de novo and concluded that the
Board incorrectly found the employees were lawfully ejected and
excluded from the employer's premises.1 82 As such, even in the limited

&

Cir. 2009); Dean Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 551 F.3d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Carpenters & Millwrights,
Local Union 2471 v. NLRB, 481 F.3d 804 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Flying Food Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 471
F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Ceridian Corp. v. NLRB, 435 F.3d 352 (D.C. Cir. 2006); ITT Industries,
Inc. v. NLRB, 413 F.3d 64 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Shamrock Foods Co. v. NLRB, 346 F.3d 1130 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); Ark Las Vegas Restaurant Corp. v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 99 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Lee Lumber
Bldg. Material Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Antelope Valley Bus Co. v. NLRB,
275 F.3d 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Pacific Bell v. NLRB, 259 F.3d 719 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Tasty
Baking Co. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 114 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Halle Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 247 F.3d
268 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Ross Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 235 F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Garland, J.
concurring); United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union Local 400 v. NLRB, 222 F.3d 1030,
1031 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Mohave Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. NLRB, 206 F.3d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
Pioneer Hotel, Inc. v. NLRB, 182 F.3d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
177. See Guard Publishing Co., 571 F.3d 53, 62; Carpenters & Millwrights, Local Union
2471, 481 F.3d 804, 813; United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 222 F.3d 1030, 1039;
PioneerHotel, Inc., 182 F.3d 939, 948 (holding against the Board in part).
178. See Ceridian Corp., 435 F.3d 352, 356-57 (citing to Chevron, the court concludes "[1]ike
other administrative agencies, the NLRB is entitled to judicial deference when it interprets an
ambiguous provision of a statute that it administers"); see also ITT Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 413
F.3d 64, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying Chevron analysis to Board's interpretation of the Act and
ultimately deferring and upholding the Board's rule as "'rational and consistent' with the NLRA,
'even if [the Court] would have formulated a different rule had [it] sat on the Board") (citations
omitted).

179. See, e.g., Ceridian Corp., 435 F.3d at 356 ("[T]he NLRB is entitled to judicial deference
when it interprets an ambiguous provision of a statute that it administers." (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted)).
180. See Guard PublishingCo., 571 F.3d at 53.
18 1. See id. at 62.
182. 222 F.3d 1030, 1035, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (The Court reasoned that de novo review was
appropriate because the case involved Virginia law, and the Board does not have any expertise with
respect to that law.).
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occasions where the Court set aside the Board's findings, it still found in
favor of the Union. 18 3
In light of his consistent deference to Board rulings and reliance of
Chevron,1 84 it is conceivable that Circuit Judge Garland would find the
Seventh and Ninth Circuit's analyses convincing and adopt the Board's
interpretation of section 7 and application of FAA.
VI.

CONCLUSION

D.R. Horton and its progeny highlight the tension between the
broad application of the FAA and the rights granted and protected by the
NLRA. While the Supreme Court's construction of the FAA is such that
one assumes that enforceability of arbitration agreements overrides any
other statutory right, the Board has outlined and advocated that the
NLRA is unique to all other statutory rights because it confers the right
to act concertedly to employees. 85 In light of the distinct statutory
structure that is unlike any other federal statute, Supreme Court
precedent does not necessarily demand that the NLRA should yield to
the FAA as it pertains to class arbitration waivers.
The Board has had several successes in its upward battle of
convincing the federal courts to adopt its interpretation of section 7 and
Supreme Court precedent of the FAA. 186 As discussed in this Article,
although several circuits have already ruled for enforcement of class
arbitration waivers, along with numerous district courts across the
country, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have adopted the Board's
interpretation.
With pending petitions for writ of certiorari before the
Supreme Court, it is clear the highest court will likely settle the issue.
While four dissenting justices from Concepcion are still on the court, the
183. Guard Publishing Co., 571 F.3d at 62; United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l, 222
F.3d at 1039; see also Carpenters & Millwrights, Local Union 2471 v. NLRB, 481 F.3d 804, 813
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (vacating the Board's refusal to pierce the employer company's corporate veil).
But see Pioneer Hotel, Inc. v. NLRB, 182 F.3d 939, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding in part against the
Board's determination and in favor for the employer).
184. See Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted);
Ceridian Corp., 435 F.3d at 356-57 (citations omitted).
185. See infta notes 148-166.
186. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1153, 1161 (7th Cir. 2016); Morris, 834 F.3d at
987.
187. See, e.g., Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1155, 1161 (holding the arbitration provision violates
sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA because it "precludes employees from seeking any class, collective,
or representative remedies to wage-and-hour disputes"); Morris, 834 F.3d at 987 (stating that it
"join[s] the Seventh Circuit in treating the interaction between the NLRA and the FAA in a very
ordinary way . .. prevent[ing] enforcement of that waiver").
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latest election results indicate that Justice Scalia's successor will likely
be a conservative jurist in the mold of his or her predecessor. As a result,
the path to victory for the Board seems to be married with further
obstacles.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

23

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol34/iss1/5

24

